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From Isolation to Active Foreign Policy: The
Hungarian-Italian Treaty of Friendship of 1927
Ildikó Császár
In my paper, I present the antecedents of the Hungarian-Italian Treaty of Friendship,
Conciliation and Arbitration of 1927. After the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary tried to find
allies to broke out of the international isolation, but was faced with numerous difficul-
ties. While the Bethlen government approached Jugoslavia, Italy offered a possibility
for Hungary, that could not be refused. Finally, the Hungarian leadership accepted the
Italians’ offer and the negotiations between the two countries commenced at the end
of 1926. Both Italy and Hungary were wary of each other, they tried to get to know
the other’s intentions, but in the end, they arrived at an understanding. After these
discussions Bethlen and Mussolini signed a Treaty of Friendship on 5th April, 1927 in
Rome.
[Hungarian-Italian relations; Treaty of Friendship; Central-Europe; active foreign pol-
icy; Alliance]
The Meeting of Hungarian and Italian Foreign Policy
After signing the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary’s foreign scope of action
narrowed considerably. To stabilize the situation of the country the
Bethlen government strived to fit into the new european political sys-
tem. For this reason, Hungary became a member of the League of Na-
tions in 1922, then in 1924 received a loan from this international orga-
nization for the Hungarian economy’s reconstruction. Thereafter the
Hungarian government wanted to find allies, but they were not quite
successful in it. After signing the peace treaties, England filled the role
of a curious but uninterested friend in Central-Europe. Although En-
glish foreign policy stood beside Hungary in a few instances, still it
never went as far as to support one of the most important goals of the
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country, the revision of the borders.1 Until the mid 1920s the foreign
relations between Hungary and France were not too cordial. This sit-
uation became worse in December, 1925 when the franc counterfeiting
scandal2 broke out. After this case the relation between the two states
stretched to a breaking point. In 1924 Hungarian-Soviet negotiations
started in order to enter into diplomatic relations, but in the end the
agreement was not realized because of internal and foreign pressure.3
There was opening towards Germany as well, because the thought of
an alliance with Germany occurred to several Hungarian politicians
(for example István Bethlen, Gyula Gömbös).4 However as Foreign
Minister Gustav Stresemann pursued a policy of reconciliation, they
could not form a cooperation in the matter of the revision. Because of
all this after World War I, the Hungarian diplomacy had very limited
scope of action and this situation was made even harder by the Lit-
tle Entente’s5 undermining work. The Bethlen government wanted to
break out of the isolation and there were twoways accomplish this: ei-
ther it comes to an agreement with the states of the Little Entente or it
dissolves their unity. Both alternatives could have led to different con-
sequences. Should Hungary reach an agreement with the three states,
then it de facto acknowledges the borders set in Trianon, which was
1 I. ROMSICS, A brit külpolitika és a „magyar kérdés“ 1914–1946, in: Századok, 2, 1996,
pp. 297–298.
2 In the middle of December 1925 the Netherlandish authorities arrested Arisztid
Jankovich Hungarian Colonel of the Hungarian army’s General Staff and his two
associates, after they wanted to exchange fake thousand frank notes in the banks.
The participants wanted to take revenge on France for the Treaty of Trianon with
this action, and they wanted to finance irredentist activity from the money that came
frome the exchange of fake notes. During the examination of the case several high
ranking individuals fall under suspicion, among others came up the names of István
Bethlen and Pál Teleki as well. The accused got a light sentence in the end. For details
see: B. ABLONCZY, A frankhamisítás. Hálók, személyek, döntések, in: Múltunk, 1,
2008, pp. 29–56.
3 L. GULYÁS, A Horthy-korszak külpolitikája, II. Vol., Máriabesnyo˝ 2013, pp. 11–15.
4 P. PRITZ, 20. századi magyar külpolitika, in: Korunk, 4, 2010, p. 51.
5 The Little Entente was a political and military alliance between Czechoslovakia, Yu-
goslavia and Romania, which came into being by a net of bilateral treaties (August
14th, 1920 Czechoslovak–Yugoslavian; April 23rd, 1921 Czechoslovak–Romanian;
June 7th, 1921 Romanian–Yugoslavian). Its members were advocates of preventing
the Hungarian revisional aspirations and the restoration of the House of Habsburg,
their main objective was the preservation of the state of affairs which came to be after
the first world war and was legalized in the peace treaties.
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absolutely unacceptable at that time. For the other option however
they would need to reach an agreement with at least one of the other
countries. The Bethlen government decided in favour of opening to-
wards Yugoslavia,6 because they believed it to be the strongest Little
Entente member, moreover Hungary had the least territorial dispute
with this state.7 Before the Hungarian government took any initia-
tive steps towards Yugoslavia, the Hungarian Prime Minister wanted
to ask the Great Powers’ opinion of this idea. During the League of
Nations session in March 1926, he managed to consult with Foreign
Secretary Austen Chamberlain, who was satisfied with the Hungar-
ian initiative. Bethlen also discussed the question with Dino Grandi,
the Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs. During the discussion,
the Hungarian Prime Minister said, that with the cessation of the fi-
nancial and military supervision, Hungary plans to step on the road
of active foreign politics. Because of this he wanted to find out from
Grandi, that in the Italians’ opinion with which of their neighbours
should the Bethlen government develop a friendlier relation, and he
asks this, because in this matter “he wishes to act in harmony with the
Italian government’s opinion”. Grandi could not provide an appropriate
answer, but he had confidence that he could give a positive response
to the question soon.8 To understand the Italian’s reserved attitude I
find it necessary to outline Italy’s foreign policy after World War I.
6 In the time period discussed by the paper officially there was no state which was
called Yugoslavia yet, because the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes changed
its designation to Yugoslavia only in 1929. In the paper I use Yugoslavia neverthe-
less, because based on the on the sources, among the contemporaries the designation
Yugoslavia was as widespread as the official Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
In the Hungarian and Italian diplomatic reports that I examine, we came upon the
designation Yugoslavia predominately as well. Moreover both designations are used
in the literature dealing with this era and the state. As a result of all this I decided
to use the designation Yugoslavia in our paper, I only departed from this, if I quoted
the contemporary source literally and they did not use the designation Yugoslavia in
it.
7 Á. HORNYÁK, Magyar-jugoszláv diplomáciai kapcsolatok 1918–1927, Újvidék 2004,
p. 213.
8 Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (hereafter MNL OL), Reserved
Records of the Department of Political Affaires (hereafter K 64), 19. csomó, 23. tétel,
res. pol. 154. Discussion between Bethlen and Grandi on 11th March 1926. Budapest,
22nd March, 1926.
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After the war, among the primary goals of Italian liberal-nationalist
foreign politics was making the country’s status as a Great Power
more stable and to acquire hegemony over the Danube-basin region.
After the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy broke apart, the Italian state
could have a breath of relief, because they got rid of their big terri-
tories neighbour and with this the door to the Central-Europen re-
gion was open. However, on 1st December 1918, with the approval
of the Great Powers, Yugoslavia came into being, which significantly
reduced Italy’s opportunities in its aspirations towards the Danube-
basin, moreover France showed keen interest towards the region.9
Because of this Italian foreign politics strived to eliminate the Yugosla-
vian state, which they wanted to carry out based on the concept out-
lined by General Pietro Badoglio. Per the concept, that got known as
the Badoglio Plan, Yugoslavia on one hand must be isolated from the
outside, also their unsettled questions with the neighbouring coun-
tries must be instigated. On the other it must be disintegrated from the
inside by bringing to the surface ethnic conflicts, and the widespread
support of anti-state propaganda actions.10 This plan was soon re-
moved from the agenda, because on 12th November, 1920, an Ital-
ian Yugoslavian treaty was signed in Rapallo. Per the agreement,
the Italians got Trieste, Zara and some other Dalmatian islands, and
Fiume was declared a free state. At the end of 1922 the fascist Benito
Mussolini assumed power in Italy, who continued the foreign politics
guidelines used up to then for a while. He wanted to realize the hege-
mony above the Danube-basin region by relying on the Little Entente,
and because of this he tried to make approaches to these states. One
of the neuralgic points of Italian-Yugoslavian relations was the ques-
tion of authority over Fiume, on which they came to an understanding
in the Treaty of Rome on 27th January, 1924. Under the terms of the
decision Fiume got under Italian authority and in exchange the Ser-
bians got Susak harbour district. They also declared, that in the future
they will stand guard over the adherence of the Treaties of Trianon,
Saint-Germain, and Neuilly, moreover the two countries will coordi-
nate with each other in question concerning Central-Europe. To calm
the other Little Entente states, they declared, that the agreement is not
9 Zs. L. NAGY, Itália és Magyarország a párizsi békekonferencia idején, 1919, in: I.
ROMSICS (ed.),Magyarország és a nagyhatalmak a 20. Században, Budapest 1995, p. 83.
10 M. BUCARELLI,Mussolini e la Jugoslavia (1922–1939), Bari 2006, p. 11.
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directed against Czechoslovakia or Romania.11 In the same year they
made final the Czechoslovak-Italian Treaty of Collaboration as well,
and with this Mussolini took another step in the realization of the plan
about the Danube-basin region.
The international atmosphere after the signing of the Locarno Pact
presented a favourable situation for Italian foreign political aspira-
tions. The treaties of mutual guarantee were signed on 16th Octo-
ber, 1925 and in one of them Germany’s western borders were fixed.
Thereafter the thought occurred to the Great Powers, that the Locarno
principles should be layed down in the Central-European and Balkan
region as well. To carry this outMussolini suggested a Danube-Balkan
Locarno, per which the participating countries would assure the ad-
herence of the existing agreements by the signing of bilateral agree-
ments, respectively they would solve any differences of opinion be-
tween each other by arbitrary means, with Italy’s supervision.12
Among the members of the Danube-Balkan Locarno they wanted to
have Austria, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and
Hungary. In the spirit of the plan the rapprochement between Italy
and Yugoslavia was on the agenda again, however the deepening of
Italian-Albanian relations caused serious tension between the states.
Ahmed Zogu rose to power at the end of 1924 with Yugoslavian sup-
port, however after a short time he started to approach Italy. Yugosla-
via looked upon the rapprochement between Italy and Albania re-
lations with jealously. This relation was confirmed when Mussolini
and Ahmed Zogu signed the Italian-Albanian Treaty of Tirana on 27th
November, 1926.13 With this step the already strained Italian-Yugo-
slavian relations broke off and because of this the realization of the
Danube-Balkan Locarno got even farther. The situation was made
even worse by the fact, that Czechoslovakia wanted rather to real-
ize the ideas regarding the Central-European region with English and
French leadership. Because of all this by July 1926 the Danube-Balkan
11 BUCARELLI, p. 29.
12 HORNYÁK, p. 203.
13 With the Italian-Albanian Treaty of Friendship and Safety Italy guaranteed not only
territorial, but also political status quo regarding Albania. They committed them-
selves to not sign any agreements with other powers that would hurt the others in-
terests. In addition they reinforced the secret military agreement accepted in August,
1925, which clause contained the possibility of an uprising against Yugoslavia.
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Locarno got off the agenda of Italian foreign policy and Italy went
back to the realization of the Badoglio Plan.14
Given the circumstances, when Bethlen had a discussion with
Grandi in March 1926, the Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
was reserved, because at the time the negotiations between Italy and
Yugoslavia were still on their way about the realization of the Danube-
Balkan Locarno.15 Most likely they made the extent of their support
of Hungarian foreign policy in Belgrade depend on the outcome of
this. At the League of Nations’ session in March, 1926, István Bethlen
had discussions with Momcˇilo Nincˇic´, Yugoslavian Foreign Minister
as well, after talking with the Great Powers. The Hungarian Prime
Minister offered the possibility of an arbitration agreement, which the
Nincˇic´ did not rule out, and at the same time he agreed with the fact,
that Hungary, for the time being, wanted to sign a treaty like this only
with Yugoslavia out of its neighbours.16 During the summer of 1926
András Hory, the Hungarian Minister to Belgrade met again with the
Yugoslavian Foreign Minister in Bled, where they had long and con-
fidential discussions. Now Nincˇic´ “spontaneously declared that he would
be willing to sign with us [Hungarians] a treaty of friendship and mutual
non-aggression pact”.17 An agreement like this could lead to serious
consequences, because on one handHungary could successfully break
out of isolation with this, and on the other the loosening of the Lit-
tle Entente’s union could successfully begin. Because of all this the
preparations for the agreement ought to have been kept a secret from
Czechoslovakia and Romania. On 29th August, 1926, on the celebra-
tion organized for the 400th year anniversary of the Battle of Mohács,
GovernorMiklós Horthy talked in his speech about the resurrection of
Serbian-Hungarian friendship. With this he made clear to everybody
the rapprochement between the two countries. Among those dealing
with the topic there are spirited discussions to the present day, about
what kind of motivations could the Governor have had to reveal the
14 Italy and Hungary supported on several occasions the separatist movements which
were in Yugoslavia. For details see: P. HAMERLI, The Hungarian-Italian Support of
the Croatian Separatism between 1928 and 1934, in: West Bohemian Historical Review,
5, 1, 2015, pp. 51–70.
15 MNL OL, K 64, 19. csomó, 23. tétel, res. pol. 154. Discussion between Bethlen and
Grandi on 11th March, 1926. Budapest, 22nd March, 1926.
16 HORNYÁK, pp. 216–217.
17 A. HORY, Bukarestto˝l Varsóig, Budapest 1987, p. 216.
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Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement.18 There is no doubt however
that Horthy’s speech elicited serious reverberations in the surround-
ing countries. The Little Entente states reacted immediately to the
Hungarian Governor’s speech through the press,19 and Nincˇic´ tried
to present the situation, as if the agreement between Hungary and
Yugoslavia would only be the first step in consolidating the Central-
European situation.20 Earlier the Hungarian historians thought that
Horthy’s speech was the reason why the Hungarian-Yugoslavian rap-
prochement became livelier, nowadays however some of them (Ár-
pád Hornyák, Pál Pritz) believes, that the exact opposite happened,
thus an alienation could be observed between the two states.21 It is
certain however that Horthy’s speech aroused Italy’s interest. I men-
tioned that after the summer of 1926 one of the main objectives of Ital-
ian foreign policy was to carry out the Badoglio Plan, but its realiza-
tion would have met with serious difficulties, if an agreement would
have happened between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless on
13th September, 1926 Dino Grandi stated the exact opposite of that be-
fore Lajos Walko Hungarian Foreign Minister, because he said that
“we would welcome a Hungarian-Yugoslavian rapprochement just as much
today as half a year ago”. In Walko’s opinion with the cessation of the
financial supervision over Hungary, the question of active foreign pol-
icy could come to the front, which Grandi supported so much during
his last discussion with Bethlen. The Italian Undersecretary of For-
eign Affairs offered the signing of a Hungarian-Italian treaty of arbi-
tration, but he distinctly emphasized that this is only his opinion, thus
he did not say this in the name of his government.22 On 13th Septem-
ber, 1926 Lajos Walko had a talk with Momcˇilo Nincˇic´ as well, where
18 L. T. VIZI, The Hungarian Effort to Dissolve the Unity of the Little Entente in 1926,
in: Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2, 2013, pp. 140–145.
19 For a summary of the reactions in Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Serbian and Austrian
press see: L. T. VIZI, „Hiszem és remélem, hogy. . . hamarosan visszatérhet a régi
barátság és megértés.“ Horthy Miklós mohácsi beszéde és a szerb orientáció alterna-
tívája a magyar külpolitikában, in: Közép-Európai Közlemények, 4, 2013, pp. 15–22.
20 Ibidem, p. 26.
21 R. KEREPESZKI, Horthy Miklós mohácsi beszéde, 1926, in: P. VARGA – O. SZÁ-
RAZ – M. TAKÁCS (eds.), A magyar emlékezethelyek kutatásának elméleti és módszertani
alapjai, Debrecen 2013, p. 314.
22 MNL OL, K 64, 19. csomó, 23. tétel, res. pol. 448. Record of the discussion between
Lajos Walko and Dino Grandi. Budapest, 17th September, 1926.
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they discussed further the possibilities of an agreement between the
two states. The Yugoslavian Foreign Minister found it conceivable to
establish an agreement of friendship, non-aggression and arbitration,
in a way that it would not offend other agreements between Belgrade
and other states. In any case, they agreed at the end that the Hungar-
ian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will work out a draft-contract which
they will forward to Belgrade. Walko added that it is absolutely nec-
essary that they find solutions to pending questions, among others
they have to negotiate about railway-connections, the egress to Adria
and other matters as well.23 A month later Ercole Durini di Monza
Italian Minister to Budapest visited Bethlen and told him, that Mus-
solini would like to collaborate in the arrangement of the Hungarian-
Yugoslavian agreement, and he wants to have discussions about this
with the Hungarian Prime Minister at the end of October or the be-
ginning of November. In the fascist leader’s opinion, even a “à trois”,
a triple agreement could be signed between Hungary, Yugoslavia and
Italy.24 After the discussions Walko asked Albert Nemes Hungarian
Minister to Rome, to try and ascertain the Italian’s plan. Mussolini
told Nemes that he is not against the Hungarian-Yugoslavian agree-
ment, as an economical contract. The fascist leader added that he
wants to establish a far-reaching political agreement with the Hungar-
ian government, which in his opinion, would have greater advantages
for Hungary, than an agreement with Yugoslavia.25
There were two courses before the Bethlen government. On one
hand, it could continue with the so called Central-Europen road and
could strengthen the Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations. On the
other however by the summer of 1926 the financial supervision over
the country ceased, and was only a matter of time before the military
supervision ends as well. After this active foreign politics became pos-
sible for Hungary, and on of its primary goals was the revision, and
they wanted to achieve it with Great Power support.26 After Mus-
23 HORNYÁK, p. 232.
24 MNL OL, K 64, 19. csomó, 23. tétel, res. pol. 499. Record of the discussion between
Durini and Bethlen. Budapest, 16th October, 1926.
25 Ibidem, res. pol. 515, telegram 81. Report of Albert Nemes. Budapest, 23rd October,
1926.
26 M. ORMOS, Bethlen koncepciója az olasz-magyar szövetségro˝l (1927–1931), in: Tör-
ténelmi Szemle, 1–2, 1971, pp. 135–137.
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solini’s proposition István Bethlen decided on the Italian alternative
and the negotiations for the Hungarian-Italian treaty began.
Preparations of the Hungarian-Italian Treaty
The Italian government still showed interest in the current state of the
Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations, but they usually only got hazy
answers to their questions about it. The Italian Minister to Budapest
tried several times to acquire information from prominent figures of
Hungarian foreign policy. On 7th January, 1927 in his conversation
with György Barcza, who was the leader of the Political Department
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Durini made inquiries whether it is
true that Belgrade urged the signing of an arbitration agreement lately.
Barcza replied only that he is not aware of anything like this. Durini
was also interested in whether the Hungarian-Yugoslavian relations
were as cordial as it was a few months ago. Per Barcza there is no
change between the two countries, moreover they want to settle any
pending questions they have.27 Durini’s first question was eventually
answered by István Bethlen, who refuted the news, that Yugoslavia
suggested the signing of an arbitration agreement in the last few days.
The Hungarian PrimeMinister believed that this fake news was based
on Yugoslavian sources, and according to him with this they wanted
to fly a “ballon d’essait”, an experimental balloon in the air.28 The Ital-
ian Minister to Budapest inquired about the current situation of the
Hungarian-Yugoslavian negotiations in his conversation with Sándor
Khuen-Héderváry, who was the permanent Deputy of Foreign Min-
ister, but as an answer he got that “parallel conversations are happening
here and there too, sometimes we make a move there and the Yugoslavians
act the same way”.29 In the light of the previous cases it is clear to
see that Durini could not acquire confidential information from the
representatives of Hungarian foreign policy. Because of this the Hun-
27 Daily report from the conversation between Barcza and Durini. Budapest, 7th Jan-
uary, 1927. In: E. KARSAI (ed.), Iratok az ellenforradalom történetéhez 1919–1945,
Vol. IV, Budapest 1967, pp. 10–11.
28 Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter ASDMAE),
Affari Politici (hereafter AP) 1919–1930, Ungheria, busta (hereafter b.) 1755, fascicolo
(hereafter f.) 8137, n. 142. The report of Durini. Budapest, 11th January, 1927.
29 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 75. Recording of the con-
versation between Khuen-Héderváry and Durini on 19th February, 1927. Budapest,
20th February, 1927.
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garian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was prepared, that the Italians will
put a lot of questions to András Hory, the new Hungarian Minister to
Rome about the negotiations with Yugoslavia. This could be expected
because Hory was the leader of the Hungarian Legation in Belgrade,
and after theWalko-Nincˇic´ discussions in September 1926, he was sent
to the capital of Yugoslavia for two months to see through the follow-
ing arrangements that had to be made. After Hory was appointed as
the new Minister to Rome, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
gave specific directions to him about the Hungarian-Yugoslavian ne-
gotiations. Hory had to say in Italy, that Hungary and Yugoslavia are
still working on building good-neighbourly relations which is by the
way something that the Italians encouraged them to do, they should
just think about the last Grandi-Walko discussions in Genf. The two
countries plan to make an arbitration agreement between them which
would not include any clauses about friendship or alliance. Should
they inquire whether the Hungarian government made any memo-
randum for Belgrade, then he should answer that records were only
made of ongoing cases. If Mussolini were to ask to see the documents
wording, then in accordance with the instructions, he should avoid
complying with the request.30 It is worthy of note that in February
1927 Alessandro Bodrero, the Italian Minister to Belgrade, acquired a
complete copy of the memorandum and forwarded it to his govern-
ment.31
From the middle of January 1927, it was no secret before anyone
that Bethlen and Mussolini will meet in a very short time. The Italian
government wanted to know as soon as possible, when the Hungar-
ian Prime Minister plans to make his journey to Rome. Bethlen did
not give a specific answer for a considerable amount of time. The pri-
mary reason behind this stalling was, that the Hungarian government
wanted to be clear on the real intentions of Italian foreign policy, and
for this reason on one hand they wanted to find out the Italian’s plan
from Durini and on the other they wanted to get information through
the Hungarian Minister to Rome.32
30 Record of the verbal instructions given to Hory. KARSAI, pp. 18–19.
31 ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 462. Report of Alessandro
Bodrero. Belgrade, 19th February, 1927.
32 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 75. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs information material to Hory. Budapest, 20th February, 1927.
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In the first place both states were eager to know what kind of treaty
the other wants to sign and in what form do they want to carry it out.
In the middle of January 1927 István Bethlen expressed before the Ital-
ian Minister to Budapest, that during his journey to Rome, he wishes
to get to an agreement of political nature with Italy and after that the
twoMinistry of Foreign Affairs’ competent people would continue the
negotiations.33 Mussolini granted this form of consensus proposed by
the Hungarian Prime Minister, in his opinion there is nothing to pre-
vent them from signing a clean and simple conciliation and arbitration
agreement, although he does not see an urgent need for this, as there
are no concrete debated questions between the two countries. The fas-
cist leader’s point of view was that it would more useful for Hungary,
if they signed a treaty of friendship, to which they would add a con-
ciliation agreement, an arbitration agreement and also an agreement
of mutual obligation of consultation as well. With this step the Hun-
garian state could break through the Little Entente’s circle and it was
also not negligible, that they would enjoy the benefits of a Great Pow-
ers’ political and moral support. According to Mussolini, it would be
more favourable, if the Bethlen government made the first steps con-
cerning the form of the agreement, because this way Italy could not be
accused of trying to pressure Hungary.34 On 7th February, 1927 at the
time of András Hory’s introductory visit, the fascist leader suggested
that the two countries’ governments should start the negotiations of
the agreement, and in his opinion it would be enough, if Bethlen ar-
rived only by the end of the negotiations in Rome.35 Eventually they
started working out the agreement in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
however on 19th February, 1927 Khuen-Héderváry talked about his
concerns regarding this matter to Durini. The Hungarian permanent
Deputy of Foreign Minister said that in responsible quarters the ques-
tion is being dealt with, but in his opinion there is little chance of cre-
ating a draft in advance, this could probably happen only after the
discussions in Rome. Durini however still insisted that a draft should
33 ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 199. The report of Durini.
Budapest, 17th January, 1927.
34 Ibidem, n. 138/24. Benito Mussolini’s letter to the Italian Legation in Budapest.
Rome, 20th January, 1927.
35 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 69. Hory’s report to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rome, 7th February, 1927.
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be made in advance and Khuen-Héderváry confirmed again, that ful-
filling this will run into serious difficulties.36 On the same day the
Italian Minister to Budapest presented his thoughts to György Bar-
cza as well, and discussed in great detail and length, how much Italy
stood by Hungary in the case of calling back the Comission of Mili-
tary Control. Barcza felt Durini’s disquisition almost excessive, and in
his opinion the Italian Minister emphasized the support of his coun-
try this much, so that later they could present the bill to Hungary for
the gratitude that is due to them. The Hungarian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs wrote a detailed report to Hory of the discussions with
Durini. Based on the Italian Minister’s expressions they drew the con-
clusion that Italy does not wish to establish a treatywhichwouldmean
strong political constraints, although they were not entirely convinced
that Durini was well-informed. For this reason, they instructed Hory,
to present himself before the Italians, as if he knew very little of the
planned treaty and inquire about what Durini said to his government.
Exclusively for informingHory the HungarianMinistry of Foreign Af-
fairs wrote down its ideas about the form of the planned Hungarian-
Italian treaty. First, they thought about signing an arbitration agree-
ment which would get a cordial introduction and it should be free
of any political obligations. Should this be insufficient to the Italian
Government, then in addition to this they could express through a
secret exchange of notes that a friendly relationship exists between
the two countries and they would exchange views with each other
in questions concerning them. They emphasized distinctly that this
note could not include any obligations regarding alliance, neutrality,
guarantee or non-aggression.37 At the end of February 1927 Hory and
Grandi discussed in great length the situation between Hungary and
Yugoslavia. Grandi took offence at the fact, that they still don’t get ad-
equate information from the state of theHungarian-Yugoslavian nego-
tiations and expressed that in Italy it would have unpleasant reverber-
ations, if theywould establish any agreement that would domore than
36 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 75. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs information material to András Hory. In appendix they attached
the two records that contained the discussions between Durini and the two Hungar-
ian foreign political persons, Khuen-Héderváry and György Barcza. Budapest, 20th
February, 1927.
37 Ibidem.
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settle technical questions. Hory answered the question in accordence
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ instructions mentioned, and his
words put Grandi off. The Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
explained his declaration in Geneva with being in a serious dilemma
at that time since “he could hardly talk us [Hungarians] out of having dis-
cussions with Yugoslavia, who is in a friendly relation with us. Otherwise,
– he added – at that time only the signing of a Hungarian-Yugoslavian arbi-
tration agreement was in question”. After this Grandi made it clear, that
“reality is different today”, then what it was in the time of the Italian-
Yugoslavian agreement which signed in 1924. Based on this conversa-
tion Hory believed that the Italians wanted to know in any case, what
the Hungarian government expects from Bethlen’s journey to Rome,
to set the price of friendship per that.38
It is clear to see that both countries took steps to get to know the
other side’s intentions thoroughly. At the beginning of March, 1927
István Bethlen told Durini that he wishes to sign an arbitration agree-
ment with Italy, which would include a clause that would highlight
the friendship between the two states. The Hungarian Prime Min-
ister asked if this conception would be suitable, for what the Italian
Minister to Budapest replied only, that he would inquire at his gov-
ernment.39 Thus the Italians still did not give a precise answer to the
exact form of the planned treaty. The Hungarian government how-
ever still wanted to make Mussolini show his hand. Lazar Markovic´
Yugoslavian diplomat visited to Budapest in the beginning of March,
1927 and the Hungarian press continuously informed about his pres-
ence. The Italians interest was aroused with this indeed, Durini asked
directly from Khuen-Héderváry, if Markovic´’s visit had any political
purpose. The Hungarian permanent Deputy of Foreign Minster reas-
sured the Italian Minister to Budapest, because according to himMar-
kovic´ was only in Budapest because of his economic interests. Khuen-
Héderváry added confidentially that the relation between Markovic´
and the new Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, Ninko Peric´ is very bad,
they have not talked to each other in nearly five years, therefore the
Yugoslavian diplomat could not have had any political missions. Con-
38 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol 87. Hory’s report to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rome, 28th February, 1927.
39 Ibidem, res. pol 87ad., 26. számjeltávirat. The report of Khuen-Héderváry to András
Hory. Budapest, 28th February, 1927.
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tinuing the conversation Khuen-Héderváry asked Durini what kind
of reply did he get from his government regarding the planned agree-
ment. The ItalianMinister to Budapest replied that they thought about
the same kind of treaty in Rome, like the one Bethlen talked about,
but they want to insert another paragraph which would contain that
the two countries would consult with each other in certain cases.40
The Hungarian permanent Deputy of Foreign Minister thought that
there is nothing to prevent the assurance of the mutual consultational
obligation by exchange of letters, but he added, that in this question
Bethlen’s opinion would count in the first place.41 With this conver-
sation the Italian’s intentions became clear as well and the Hungar-
ian side could set its mind at ease, that Mussolini does not plan to
sign a treaty involving political constrictions with Hungary. In ad-
dition to all this, the exact date of Bethlen’s journey started to take
shape, the Hungarian Prime Minister intended to go to Rome around
2nd April, where he wanted to conduct discussions with Mussolini
about the Central-European situation, the Anschluss, the Slavic dan-
ger and the Habsburg-restoration.42 The Italian government wanted
to see the draft-contract now. The leader of the Political Department of
the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Raffaele Guariglia told András
Hory, that the document which will be sent through Durini to Rome,
will be the foundation of the two Prime Ministers’ discussions. Guar-
iglia pointed out, that during the examination of the draft, they will
pay attention, that it would not conflict with the Italian-Czechoslovak
agreement signed in July 1924 and the Italian-Yugoslavian agreement
signed in January 1924. He added that the two state’s governments
had to be informed a few days before signing the Hungarian-Italian
agreement in order to avoid unnecessary excitement.43 The Italians
informed the third member of Little Entente, Romania who was in al-
liance with Italy, about the upcoming agreement. Mussolini ordered
the Italian Minister to Bucharest, Carlo Durazzo, to inform Romanian
Prime Minister Alexandre Avarescu personally, that during Bethlen’s
40 HORNYÁK, p. 244.
41 ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 696. The report of Durini.
Budapest, 14th March, 1927.
42 Ibidem, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 1320. The report of Durini. Budapest 28th February, 1927.
43 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 110, 37. számjeltávirat.
The report of Hory. Rome, 12th March, 1927.
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journey to Rome they will arrange a Hungarian-Italian treaty. The Ital-
ian leader summed up the contents of this agreement, then asked the
Romanian government, to look at this treaty as another step from Italy
towards consolidating order and peace. In his opinion this agreement
will make Hungarian-Romanian approaches easier, which was always
desired by the Italian government.44
Beside the discussions about the Hungarian-Italian treaty, they also
worked on strengthening the cultural connections between the two
countries, and because of that on 15th March, 1927 Kunó Klebelsberg45
Minister of Religion and Education went to Italy. Aside from fulfill-
ing official goals, this visit served to get a good grip of the situation,
before the Hungarian Prime Ministers’ journey to Rome. Klebelsberg
was accompanied by Bethlen’s good friend, the director of the Hun-
garian News Agency, Miklós Kozma, who made numerous records of
his impressions he got during his Italian journey. Kozma felt that the
Italians overstated the importance of the visit too much and he be-
lieved this was not done without some ulterior motives. In his point
of view this exaggeration was meant on one hand for Yugoslavia and
on the other however for the Hungarian Prime Minister, whom they
wanted to be able to in force his will less during his journey to Rome.46
The Italians started preparing for the reception of Klebelsberg months
before, because theMinister visited Naples, Florence, Bologna andMi-
lan as well besides Rome and stayed in Italy up to 27th March, 1927.
Most assuredly they wanted to dazzle the minister with the enormous
interest of the press, the big crowds, the pompous banquets and other
programmes, the reason for this among other things, was that they
knew very well, what a significant role he had in Hungarian culture
and politics. This conclusion can be drawn from the diplomatic report
of Pasquale Diana, First Secretary of the Italian Legation in Budapest,
whowrote in the autumn of 1926 before the parliamentary election the
following about the minister: “Count Klebelsberg is one of the most out-
standing members of the current Hungarian government, he has numerous
followers in the country and is the most noteworthy candidate of Bethlen’s
44 ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 558/133. Mussolini’s letter
to the Italian Legation in Bucharest. Rome, 15th March, 1927.
45 About Klebelsberg Kunó’s life and cultural policy see for details: G. UJVÁRY, Egy
európai formátomú államférfi Klebelsberg Kuno (1875–1932), Pécs – Budapest 2014.
46 M. ORMOS, Egy magyar médiavezér: Kozma Miklós, Vol. I, Budapest 2000, p. 145.
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successor, if he nominates himself in the near future.”47 To sum it up with
Klebelsberg’s journey both sides had political interests as well behind
the noble cultural goals.
During Klebelsberg’s journey to Italy on 18th March, 1927, the Hun-
garian government handed Durini the 22 paragraph long draft of the
Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration and they attached
to this the draft for the exchange of letters about mutual consultational
obligation.48 Mussolini inspected the documents and found that they
will suffice for the goals, but he reserves the right, that they will only
talk with Bethlen about some changes regarding matters of form dur-
ing their meeting in Rome. Moreover, he thought the idea worth con-
sidering that the text should be divided into two records, practically
to give prominence with one to the most important leading princi-
ples of the friendship and conciliation treaty and to insure the details
of the arbitration process with the other. In the end, Mussolini an-
nounced that the following four documents would be signed in Rome:
a treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration, a protocol of the ar-
bitration, a protocol, or an exchange of letters about Fiume, and a se-
cret exchange of letters about the mutual obligation of consultation.49
The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs rewrote the treaty in accor-
dance with the Italian request and on 2nd April, 1927 István Bethlen
and his retinue set off to Rome.
The Meeting of Bethlen and Mussolini
The two PrimeMinistersmetwith each other on 4th April, 1927 at noon
at the Palazzo Chigi. During the discussion Bethlen described Hun-
gary’s foreign affairs situation, inwhich Bethlen told, that with the ces-
sation of the financial and military supervision, the roads of active for-
eign politics opened before the country. Concerning Central-Europe
he remarked, that France plays the main role in the region right now,
but in his opinion in the future Germany and Russia will pick up the
baton. Bethlen also believed, that there is a possibility, that a Slavic
47 ASDMAE, AP 1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1754, f. 8121, n. 3081/699. The report of
Pasquale Diana. Budapest, 22nd September, 1926.
48 Durini sent both French-written drafts to the Italian government. ASDMAE, AP
1919–1930, Ungheria, b. 1754, f. 8121, n. 743 and n. 746. Budapest, 18th March, 1927.
49 Ibidem, b. 1755, f. 8137, n. 559/113. Benito Mussolini’s letter to the Italian Legation
in Budapest. Rome, 25th March, 1927.
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preponderance may develop in the Danube-basin, which would be
dangerous for both Italy and Hungary, therefore it is both states’ com-
mon interest to break up the Little Entente’s unity. Mussolini accepted
this conception and made it clear, that he would not like, if anything
more significant than an arbitration treaty would be established be-
tween Hungary and Yugoslavia. The Italian leader would have urged
the Hungarian-Romanian advances, but Bethlen told him, that there
is no possibility of that, until Romania makes changes in its politics
concerning minorities. The Italian-Yugoslavian relations came up as
well, about which Mussolini said, that “Italy and Yugoslavia will either
be friends or enemies, but they cannot stay neutral”.50 After foreign pol-
itics they switched over to the question of Fiume. Bethlen told, that
originally, they wanted to make use of an entire basin, but since the
current Hungarian goods traffic could not fully utilize it, they gave up
the idea. For that very reason he asked Mussolini to promise to relin-
quish even a full basin through negotiations to Hungary, should the
volume of Hungarian goods traffic increase later. The Italian leader
accepted Bethlen’s request.51 On 4th April, 1927, Khuen-Héderváry
conducted discussions with Grandi and Guariglia, where the two Ital-
ian politicians told him, that they agree with the wording of the se-
cret exchange of letters, but they want to change out a half sentence,
which was eventually accepted by the Hungarian Deputy of Foreign
Minister. On 5th April, 1927 Bethlen and Mussolini signed the Italian-
Hungarian Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration. As per
the earlier discussions the treaty consisted of two parts: in the first
they put on record the text of the friendship, conciliation and arbi-
tration agreement in five points, and in the second part the protocol.
The first point of the first part declared, that a constant and unending
friendship will be among the two states. In the 2nd, 3rd, 4th points they
put on record, that in the following period they will use arbitration
process to settle any disputes that may arise between them, and that
it can only come into question in legal disputes. In the 5th point they
made a promise, to exchange the documents of approval regarding
the treaty as soon as possible in Rome, and following that the agree-
50 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 171. Recording of the
discussion between Bethlen and Mussolini. Rome, 4th April 1927.
51 Ibidem. Recording ot the discussion between Bethlen and Mussolni in the topoic of
the harbor in Fiume. Rome, 4th April 1927.
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ment will remain in force for ten years “and so on”.52 Alongside the
protocols about the proceedings and Fiume, they also signed the se-
cret exchange of letters. In this it was stated, that the two country’s
political interests are the same on several points and since they wish
to be in close friendship, therefore they undertake to give diplomatic
and political support to each other in questions concerning them, and
for all this they accept the mutual obligatory consultation.53
The two Prime Minister discussed the Habsburg-restoration as well
on 5th April. Bethlen told that the solution for questions about the
Hungarian throne is not timely right now, the question has not ma-
tured enough neither in terms of internal politics or foreign politics.
As I mentioned before, earlier there were news in the press, that as a
solution for the Habsurg-restoration Habsburg Albert is meant to be
married with the daughter of either the Italian or the Romanian king.
This statement was expressly refuted back then. During the meeting
on 5th April however Bethlen brought the question up: “For the pur-
pose to see how Mussolini reacts to it, I mentioned that it would be time
for Albrecht [Albert Habsburg] to marry, but Mussolini did not give the
slightest reaction to it.”54 The negotiations continued 6th April, 1927.
This was the time when Bethlen brought up Hungary’s necessary ar-
mament, as he had knowledge of the fact, that the Hungarian-Italian
weapons from World War I were still in Italy, and asked Mussolini to
transport them back in secret. The Italian leader not only supported
the Hungarian minister’s request, but also took it upon himself, that
the weapons would be repaired in Italy and after will be sent on their
way to Hungary.55
Closing Remarks
In my paper, I wrote about the antecedents of the Hungarian-Italian
Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Arbitration. The Hungarian
52 D. HALMOSY (ed.), Nemzetközi szerzo˝dések 1918–1945, Budapest 1983, pp. 267–268.
53 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 171. The wording of
the letter of exchange about the mutual obligatory consultation in French. Rome, 5th
April 1927.
54 Bethlen’s records about his discussion with Mussolini. Rome, 5th April, 1927. KAR-
SAI, pp. 58–59.
55 MNL OL, K 64, 24. csomó, 23. tétel, 144. alszám, res. pol. 166. Record of the
discussion between Bethlen and Mussolini about the topic of Hungary’s armament.
Rome, 6th April, 1927.
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and Italian archival sources complemented each other excellently,
with their help we could map some less or completely unknown mo-
mentums.
It may not be an overstatement to say, that in the period of the
treaty’s preparation both sides could be described with mutual dis-
trust. The conversations imply this, that occurred between the Hun-
garian and Italian representatives. Italy wanted to get to know more
thoroughly the actual state of the negotiations between Hungary and
Yugoslavia, but the Hungarian side tried to give as vague answers to
questions regarding this as possible. And the Hungarian Ministry of
ForeignAffairs wanted to know as soon as possible what kind of treaty
the Italian side wants to sign with Hungary, but they did not get an ex-
act answer until March, 1927. It was important for the Bethlen govern-
ment, that Mussolini would not want to make final a strict treaty that
would come with political restrictions, since now they did not want to
fully commit themselves to Italian policy.
Although the discussions between Hungary and Italy were not en-
tirelywithout hitches, the signing of this Treatywas important for both
countries. By signing theHungarian-Italian Treaty of Friendship, Con-
ciliation and Arbitration, Hungary could step on the road of active for-
eign politics and Italy could acquire a stable ally in the Danube-basin
region.
113
